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When in control of the area of Iraq north of Baghdad, including the city of Fallujah, ISIS prepared to defend its position from inevitable government 
counterattack through the widespread use of improvised ex-
plosive devices (IEDs) laid as defensive obstacles in patterns 
similar to conventional minefields.1 The subsequent destruc-
tion of bridges over the Tigris River further strengthened 
the ability of ISIS to defend the city and prevent the civilians 
trapped within from escaping.
Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) liberated Fallujah 
in May 2016, explosive hazards (EH), most significantly IEDs 
that lie as “weapons in wait,” continue the conflict today by 
depriving the Fallujah economy and society of a full recovery. 
For example, only after the removal of two submerged IEDs in 
August 2018, was the notorious Iron Bridge reopened to traf-
fic after which a two-hour detour once again became a five- 
minute trip for many accessing a nearby maternity hospital. 
Tasks. The bridge restoration is typical of so-called stabi-
lization tasks in Fallujah that focus on EH clearance need-
ed prior to restoration of essential public services and light 
infrastructure.2 In addition, so-called humanitarian tasks 
focus on clearance of IED belts composed of victim-operated 
IEDs (VOIEDs).
Recovery. Following clearance by the United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq, from 1 October 2016 
through 22 January 2019, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) completed 199 stabilization tasks in 
Fallujah and surrounding areas. These tasks were managed by 
the UNDP and assigned in cooperation with the Government 
of Iraq through the Funding Facility for Stability (FFS)—ef-
fectively a clearing house to assign and prioritize clearance 
tasks so as to restore key infrastructure. In addition, in co-
operation with other organizations, UNMAS completed 119 
humanitarian tasks.
Mandate. Gradual progress may not be progress enough, 
however, when considered from a public and political per-
spective leading to the urgency of a “sooner-than-later” 
mandate for those organizations including UNMAS Iraq re-
sponsible for EH clearance. Arguably, this is the critical first 
step toward follow-on timely repair of infrastructure and 
by Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
A ‘SIMPLE’ MODEL 
FOR CLEARANCE
Image 1. A bridge over the Tigris River, 6 km north of Fallujah. ISIS destroyed the bridge to prevent civilians fleeing 
the city when the Iraqi Security Forces offensive began.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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ultimately the safe return home for the 1.8 million Iraqis still 
internally displaced, many living in camps. Such a mandate 
immediately leads to practical problems insofar as IED dis-
posal (IEDD) operators need to understand the threats faced 
from two aspects: type and environment.
Implications. IEDD operators must identify and classi-
fy threats, consolidate and interpret related data, and there-
by assess the threat environment. The more effectively the 
IEDD operators can draw practical conclusions about both 
the threats and the threat environments, the sooner they can 
safely commence clearance activities. Moreover, the IEDD 
community can then learn how to optimize clearance assets. 
This then leads to two questions concerning EH clearance 
in Fallujah:
1. What can the data tell us about the extent and type of 
IEDs encountered?3
2. What might the data contribute to the threat environ-
ment model?
Findings. UNMAS Iraq clearance data compiled during ac-
tivities in Fallujah leads to three conclusions key to assessing 
Figure 1. Known and suspected IED contamination around Fallujah (as of January 2019). 
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
Images 2 and 3. Typical plastic (left) and “speed bump” (right) main charge containers in Fallujah.
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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and managing on-going clearance tasks and deployment of 
clearance assets in Fallujah:4,5
1. Technical. Most IEDs found in Fallujah have been victim- 
operated (high-metal content pressure plate) devices, 
only occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices.
2. Threat. The EH environment can be defined as relatively 
simple when compared to other areas of Iraq (see accom-
panying article, page 13). 
3. Coverage. The amount and extent of contamination re-
mains the biggest clearance problem.
Basis. EH clearance tasks completed by UNMAS Iraq since 
October 2016 provide a basis for the conclusions drawn re-
garding threat type, environment, and coverage. UNMAS 
Iraq operators cleared a total of 568 complete IEDs along with 
1,139 other explosive remnants of war (ERW) from a coverage 
area of 2,586,546 sq m and safely removed another 4,384 IED 
main charges and components from this same area. In addi-
tion, UNMAS Iraq rendered safe and handed over to ISF near-
ly 10,000 kg of IED explosive content for destruction.
Components. Almost without exception, the IEDs recov-
ered in Fallujah are victim-operated (VO) and crudely manu-
factured, but effective. The most common type uses a plastic 
container such as a commercial jerry can filled with 10–20 kg 
of ammonium nitrate and aluminum-based homemade ex-
plosive (HME), high-metal contract pressure plate(s), a 9-volt 
battery, detonating cord of varying length, and a commercially- 
manufactured electrical detonator. A common variant uses a 
crudely–fabricated, low-grade, steel-flattened box (colloquial-
ly known as an “explosive speed bump”) for the main charge 
filled with the same weight and types of explosive. In the ex-
plosive speed bump variant, the explosive is often wrapped in a 
plastic bag to protect against weathering.
 In most known cases, these devices are laid in large num-
bers in linear patterns of 5-to-10 m spacing, in some cases 
Image 4. A typical IED obstacle belt on the outskirts of 
Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
Image 5. A pressure plate wrapped in orange plastic dis-
covered in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
extending 10 km, and sometimes adding multiple rows for 
density. A location in the al-Shuhada area of Fallujah (see 
Image 4) illustrates a two-row deep pattern with five plastic 
jerry can type main charges visible (shown with red circles to 
the right) representing the first row and a single main charge 
(to the left) representing part of a second row. The presence 
of buildings in the background (indicated by the black ar-
row) illustrates the proximity of EH contamination to resi-
dential areas.
Switches. Nearly all VOIEDs recovered in Fallujah are trig-
gered by pressure plates made from two flexible steel strips, 
averaging 60 cm in length, 3 cm in width, and 4 mm thick-
ness. The two strips are normally separated by a spacer such as 
a piece of wood, leaving a distance of around 1.5 cm between 
the steel strips to be closed for the switch to function. Most 
recovered pressure plates have been wrapped in black rubber 
such as an inner tube from a vehicle tire or plastic for weather- 
proofing. There is usually little attempt to camouflage the 
switches other than to bury them, normally to a depth of 5 cm 
beneath the surface. Sometimes several pressure plates will be 
discovered in close proximity wrapped in the same color plas-
tic and type suggesting a bulk manufacturing process.
Some VOIEDs feature an additional VO switch often 
called a crush wire contact or “rosary beads.” The beads 
3
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refer to tiny open switch-
es spaced at 10–30 cm in-
tervals along lacquered 
wire insulated by clear 
plastic tubing. The entire 
switch can exceed 10 m in 
length. While more prev-
alent in complex and ur-
ban environments, they 
account for roughly five 
percent of switches used 
on VOIEDS recovered from Fallujah’s contaminated areas 
to date, according to knowledgeable operators’ anecdotal re-
ports. To the untrained person, these can be difficult to locate 
visually or with a metal detector (see Image 5). 
Batteries are occasionally found as the spacer inside pres-
sure plates but more often are simply wrapped in tape for 
weatherproofing and lie close to the main charge, again sub-
surface. Voltage checks on a small number of recovered batter-
ies have revealed charges of a full 9-volts present, suggesting 
that most IEDs present are likely viable devices.
Main charges are usually buried separated from the battery 
by a distance of up to 2 m, again at a depth of around 5 cm. 
Some devices have been recovered with double pressure plates 
to a single main charge, others with double main charges from 
the same pressure plate. Whatever the variant, devices tend to 
be found in groups of identical devices and similarly spaced to 
those as already described. Operators in Fallujah have found 
and neutralized a number of VOIEDs equipped with anti-
handling devices of three types.
Type 1 is fabricated from a plastic electrical box approxi-
mately 10 cm squared and 5 cm deep with a rocker-type switch 
protruding from one face and laid subsurface typically 20 cm 
from the main charge. When set, the switch is held down by a 
brick or rock that, in most cases, is obviously and clearly out of 
place. The switch can be closed by removing the brick or rock, 
as well as stepping on the pressure plate, probably targeting a 
tendency of novice operators to clear the area around a sus-
pected IED before beginning render safe procedures (RSPs).
Type 2 uses the same pressure release mechanism but situ-
ates the switch underneath the main charge container. This 
method, recovered from several neutralized IEDs in Fallujah, 
targets an IED operator or virtually anyone else discover-
ing and lifting the main charge from the ground. While the 
switch is easily discovered by a trained IED operator, for the 
less experienced or untrained person it can exploit actions 
that might lead them to believe a device is safe when it is not—
for example, by severing the physical link to the switch.
Type 3, a rarely used variant, configures the pressure plate 
vertically. This type has been used to target mechanical assets 
and their operators, in particular bulldozers that have been 
used to breach IED belts. These pressure plates are similar to 
but much smaller than (no more than 30 cm in length) Types 
1 and 2. Type 3 variants are also buried much deeper (normal-
ly 10–15 cm). Setting them in a vertical plane and placed in 
locations where ISIS anticipated bulldozers might be used to 
move earth (for example, in tracks) allows for the targeting of 
valuable mechanical assets, initiating the IED when they are 
pushed aside with earth. While the main charges recovered 
in Fallujah are not large enough to destroy armored vehicles, 
they can cause extensive damage.
Although currently there is no accurate data on the precise 
numbers of anti-lift switches recovered, anecdotal evidence 
from interviews with international IEDD operators suggests 
that less than 10 percent of IEDs recovered to date are fitted 
with these devices.
Consistency. There is certainly sufficient evidence from an 
analysis of the 568 IEDs recovered to date from Fallujah by 
UNMAS Iraq operators to draw a number of conclusions, all 
relating to consistencies.
First, the design of pressure plates and main charges (either 
plastic or the explosive speed bump variant) is normally the 
same. This suggests that a deliberate and well-planned pro-
duction facility existed and was capable of manufacturing a 
large number of pressure plates and main charges with a rela-
tively high standard of design and reliability.
Second, the configuration of the device in the ground is nor-
mally similar enough to be predictable. In a given line of IEDs, 
it is extremely unusual to find a device where the switch, main 
charge, and power source are 
not located in the same lay-
out. This suggests that these 
IEDs are probably laid by 
relatively unskilled persons 
taught to emplace the IEDs 
through a series of steps or 
rules as a drill.
Image 6. A typical crush wire 
contact. Several dozen switch-
es like this may be present on 
lengths of lacquered wire up to 
10 m in length.7
Image courtesy of www.iedawareness.
com.
Images 7 and 8. An in-place anti-lift switch. Note the 
presence of the rock on the anti-handling switch and the 
proximity of that switch to the main charge. 
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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Third, the IED belts in Fallujah reveal a remarkable consis-
tency in their pattern not unlike Warsaw Pact tactics for estab-
lishing defensive minefields. Given the quantities and types of 
Soviet equipment used by Saddam’s Iraqi Army, it is reasonable 
to assume some individuals trained in conventional methods 
for laying minefields later offered their services to ISIS.
Implications. What might the community conclude from the 
data related to the work done in Fallujah concerning the types 
and locations of IEDs rendered safe? To answer this question, 
operators need to evaluate their findings relative to the envi-
ronment and RSPs. On that basis, the findings related to work 
in Fallujah show consistent and predictable patterns useful 
in planning, conducting clearance operations, and managing 
clearance assets efficiently.
Model. These consistent and predictable qualities argue for 
and help to define what the community might term a simple 
model. Several factors support this argument:
1. Location. IEDs were deployed in belts by ISIS on the pe-
riphery of Fallujah for a clear purpose, namely to stall any 
ISF assault. In these mostly rural areas, the ground could 
be dug easily and quickly for emplacement purposes.
2. Clutter. Although the defensive belts often cut through 
open ground adjacent to residential and other built-
up areas, they otherwise tend to be relatively clean, 
with little surface or subsurface metallic contamina-
tion present other than occasional items of unexplod-
ed ordnance (UXO) and associated scrap metal such as 
mortar-tail sections.
3. Dimension. Except on rare occasions—classified as the 
Type 3 IED that uses a vertical pressure plate switch and 
thereby could be viewed as a three-dimensional threat—
almost all IEDs in Fallujah are two-dimensional threats 
located either at the surface or subsurface with clear im-
plications for RSPs.
4. Degradation. IEDs are susceptible to degradation for 
reason of seasonal variations in weather, in particu-
lar the cumulative effect of repeated heavy rainfall and 
flooding. The impact of weathering is especially notice-
able on ammonium nitrate-based explosives. Numerous 
main charges recovered have shown both plastic and 
metal casings shattered by explosives expanding as they 
absorb water. Type 2 IEDs’ (explosive speed bumps) 
main charges are also susceptible to rapid oxidation of 
the casings with many severely corroded.
5. Exposure. IED pressure plates often can be found in the 
open and on the surface due to the action of rain water 
washing away less compacted earth covering them. 
6. Human. Local residents who either have witnessed, have 
roles in setting IEDs, or have knowledge of their exis-
tence have proven to be a significant source of informa-
tion concerning details on locations and emplacement 
methods, contributing to Non-technical Surveys as 
well as subsequent clearance operations.
7. Render Safe. In terms of neutralization and RSPs, 
analysis of recovered IEDs strengthens an argument 
that this is a simple environment for three reasons.
 » Easy to locate. Standard metal detection equipment 
can identify extremely strong metal signatures from 
the ubiquitous high-metal content pressure plate
 » Signature. Detector heads can localize and define 
the size of the signature, often defining the pressure 
plate before any manual intervention takes place
 » Visual. Even the crush wire contact switch has 
proved relatively easy to detect by trained personnel, 
firstly by using the naked eye and secondly by detect-
ing a strong signature via the Minelab F3 Compact 
used by the majority of UNMAS High Risk Search 
Teams in Fallujah.7
Given the relatively “clean” environment these IEDs exist 
within, as well as the identification and cancellation of spu-
rious contacts (including UXO scrap such as shrapnel), RSPs 
are normally a relatively simple and quick process.
Conclusion 
In summary, consistency and relative simplicity of de-
vice design and layout as described greatly facilitate RSPs in 
Fallujah. Where an IED operator is working within an estab-
lished IED belt, the consistency of the device’s linear pattern, 
regular spacing, and makeup is usually obvious. This then 
gives search teams, team leaders, and IED operators a degree 
of confidence in planning and conducting clearance activities.
Exceptions. Where secondary switches are incorporated into 
devices, their presence so far has been obvious. For switches 
utilizing a brick or rock to encourage pressure release, a pair 
of wires can easily be located running from the suspected 
switch location toward the main charge. For pressure re-
lease switches, the careful fingertip exploration of the area 
around the suspected main charge normally identifies wires 
running from the detonator (always found on the top of 
the main charges) to the underside of the main charge con-
tainer. Regardless of the presence of anti-handling switch-
es, RSPs remain relatively easy. IED operators identify the 
location of the IED’s component parts and then take semi- 
remote action against either the power source or the detona-
tor. A careful fingertip isolation of the switch, main charge, 
and any other suspected component easily allows them to 
5
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DEFINING COMPLEX 
ENVIRONMENTS
negate the presence of additional detonators or power sourc-
es prior to semi-remotely breaking the circuit. Hook-and-line 
procedures further reduce any residual risk to search teams in 
completing the neutralization of devices.
Skills. The simple environment model has implica-
tions for operations transferred to local national person-
nel when appropriately trained. Based on collected data and 
UNMAS-documented operations, and the types of devic-
es encountered, both search and RSPs can be broken down 
into simple, basic drills that can be taught, practiced, and as-
sessed for relatively inexperienced personnel. According to 
a year-long pilot study, after a six-week training course led 
by experienced international technical advisors, a cadre of 
predominantly former-ISF, IED-operator recruits deployed 
as members of two Rapid Response Teams to Fallujah where 
their work was monitored and found successful in terms of 
IEDs located and rendered safe.
Variables. An assessment of UNMAS data compiled from 
Fallujah suggests three variables define a simple environment 
model for conducting IED clearance both there and in simi-
lar environments. Moreover, it suggests a simple environment 
model could benefit from a second order analysis and evalua-
tion of data related to interaction of these three variables.
Caveat. The simple environment model, like all models, de-
pends upon assumptions and conditions continuing without 
change, which may not be the case for at least two reasons. 
First, the ISF previously conducted render-safe clearance of 
some IED belts near Fallujah according to military standards 
and under combat conditions, which necessitates an approach 
different from humanitarian standards. In many cases, these 
military RSPs require only the removal of detonators, probably 
by hand, while leaving the charge in place, which, within the 
context of humanitarian clearance standards constitutes a po-
tential threat. Second, evidence suggests that Iraq is not yet a 
fully post-conflict environment insofar as IEDs continue to be 
placed by ISIS operatives. Such old and new threats make con-
tinuing threat assessments necessary to ensure that processes 
in use are not likely to be exploited by any belligerent forces.
Applicability. EH clearance operations, particularly in 
high-threat and IED-laden contexts containing complex envi-
ronments such as in Mosul (see companion article, page 13) 
are, by definition, extremely expensive compared to relatively 
simple environments such as Fallujah. Given the number of 
IEDs, the worldwide effort to address clearance in a timely, 
cost-effective way while protecting operators has become a 
matter for further data analysis and revised models. Effective 
business plans need to start with solid, applicable field experi-
ence quantified by data and driving an operational concept. 
To date, the UNMAS Iraq experience in Fallujah says this is 
possible even in the short term and is already being tried and 
has proven to be a working concept. 
See endnotes page 60
Image 9. Four complete VOIEDs neutralized by a local na-
tional IED operator in the al Shuhada district of Fallujah 
on 24 January 2019.
Image courtesy of UNMAS. Image 10. A local national IEDD operator shows the re-
sults of his day’s work in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.
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